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The institutionalisation of factions in Ukraine’s parliament has proceeded in a patchy, uneven manner as a 
consequence of cross-cutting incentives created by the constitution, lower order rules and the actions of the 
president. Although factions became more organisationally complex and disciplined, membership 
instability significantly undermined these developments so that factions remained weakly institutionalised. 
Despite this, factions came to exercise greater influence over the parliamentary leadership and the 
legislative process, largely due to the formation of Ukraine’s first parliamentary majority in 2000. 
However, as this majority was orchestrated by President Kuchma, Ukraine’s parliament remains vulnerable 
to external pressure.   
 
Internal parliamentary institutions are central to the capacity of a parliament to perform 
roles essential to the functioning of a modern state, including law-making, oversight of 
the executive and representation. As parliaments are nested institutions, where key 
functions are devolved to internal institutions, scholars have singled out the roles played 
by parliamentary parties (factions) as key to institutional efficacy.1 A strong party system 
(within and beyond parliament) is seen as crucial for accountable governance and 
democratic stability.2 Therefore, parliamentary parties can carry out a wide variety of 
tasks, including: structuring and organising parliament; channeling interests for 
parliamentarians and the electorate; articulating alternative policy proposals; simplifying 
voting decisions for parliamentarians; and requiring the executive to confront 
parliamentarians as groups not individuals, making executive co-option of a parliament 
more difficult.3 However, it is intuitively obvious that in order to perform any of these 
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important functions, factions need to exist as defined and definite entities, that is, they 
need to be institutionalised.  
For post-Soviet parliaments, this raises important questions for understanding the 
path of institutional development. How far have parliamentary parties become 
institutionalised since the first (semi-)free elections in 1990?  What has been their impact 
upon parliamentary operation? This paper will examine the case of Ukraine with two 
interlinked aims: to assess party caucus (faction) institutionalisation and to explore the 
functioning and role of factions in parliament. Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, 
has experienced colossal institutional upheaval since 1990. It was transformed from a 
provincial republican soviet (lit. council) to the national parliament of a sovereign state 
and from a nominal, symbolic body into a genuine legislative and representative organ. 
As such, it faced the enormous challenge of building its institutional capacity to cope 
with the demands of new statehood during a period of extended economic crisis, foreign 
policy and constitutional uncertainties and ongoing inter-branch conflict with President 
Kuchma, who was first elected in 1994. Within this context, factions, which emerged 
only in 1990, have been developing as a key institution that has significantly impacted 
upon parliamentary operation.    
In order to identify and assess how factions changed, the analysis is based upon a 
conception of institutionalisation drawn from the work of Nelson Polsby and Samuel 
Huntington.4 Institutionalisation is seen as the process by which institutions acquire 
generally adhered to rules that make an institution's perspectives and behaviour 
independent of other institutions and social groupings. Therefore, an institutionalised 
parliament, and hence its constituent factions, will exhibit institutional complexity, 
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autonomy and coherence. The extent to which these characteristics have been acquired by 
factions will be assessed and the underlying factors shaping the path of faction 
institutionalisation will be explained by considering the role of institutional factors (for 
instance, the constitutional framework, the electoral law and  endogenous institutional 
engineering) and the strategic action of key actors (the president and parliamentary 
deputies). In this way, the case study of factions will illustrate key aspects of the 
development of Ukraine's parliament, such as the extent of its institutional integrity and 
autonomy. In March 2002, a new parliament was elected, but at the time of writing, it 
was still too early to draw conclusions about its newly formed factions. Therefore, the 
study will focus upon the third convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (1998-2002) and then 
briefly consider some of the immediate consequences of the 2002 elections.  
 The study is organised into five sections. Firstly, a brief outline of factions' 
composition and orientation offers essential background to the analysis. The second 
section will comprise an overview of the most important developments in parliament 
relating to factions, which will provide the basis for the subsequent exploration of the 
extent of factions' institutionalisation. The third section will evaluate factions' 
institutionalisation along the criteria identified by Polsby and Huntington (i.e. coherence, 
organisational complexity and autonomy). Coherence will be assessed by considering 
voting discipline and membership stability, while organisational complexity will be 
considered by looking at the internal structures created by factions. An assessment of 
autonomy will be approached in a more nuanced manner and woven throughout the 
analysis. In the fourth section, the roles played by factions in the Verkhovna Rada will be 
explored with regard to law-making and parliamentary organisation. This will locate the 
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role of factions in the Rada and assess the impact of majority formation on parliamentary 
development. The final section will consider the effect of the March 2002 elections on 
factions and parliament.  
 
Introducing Factions in the Verkhovna Rada  
 
The March 1998 elections produced no overall majority for any orientation. The left 
gained 39 per cent of seats, the right 10.4 per cent and the centre 30.7 per cent, with the 
remaining 20 per cent made up of non-affiliated and non-aligned deputies. Table 1 shows 
all factions registered between 1998-2002, producing a complicated picture that 
illustrates the fragmented parliamentary spectrum. 
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Table 1: Factions of the 3rd Convocation, May 1998- March 2002 
Faction L-R Political party basis Duration  
 
Communists Left Communist Party Whole convocation 
Left-Centre (Socialists) Left Socialist (and initially Peasants) Whole convocation 
Peasants Left Peasant 10.98-02.00 
Progressive Socialists Left Progressive Socialists 05.98-02.00 
Hromada - Hromada 05.98-02.00 
Solidarity Centre Solidarity (late 2000) 02.00-03.02 
Trudova Ukraina Centre Trudova Party, then Trudova 
Ukraina (late 2000) 
04.99-03.02 
Social Democrats  (SDPU(o)) Centre Social Democrats (United) Whole convocation 
Greens Centre Green Whole convocation 
Revival of the Regions* Centre Democratic Union (spring 2001) 02.99-03.02* 
Regions of Ukraine Centre Party of Regions 03.01-03.02 
Yabluko Centre Yabluko 09.00-03.02 
People's Democratic Party (NDP) Centre People's Democratic Party Whole convocation 
Independents (Nezalezhni) Centre - 07.98-03.00 
Unity Centre Unity (late 2001) 11.01-03.02 
Fatherland Centre Fatherland 03.99-03.02 
Reforms-Congress Right Reforms & Order, later Congress 
of Ukrainian Nationalists too 
12.98-03.02 
Ukrainian People's Rukh (Kostenko) Right Ukrainian People's Rukh 03.99-03.02 
People's Rukh of Ukraine 
(Udovenko) 
Right People's Rukh of Ukraine Whole convocation 
* Changed name to Democratic Union, 6.4.01.  
Source: Data of the Verkhovna Rada secretariat, provided by Laboratory F-4 
 
The Left 
The left factions were based upon comparatively well-established political parties with 
grassroots organisations. They had clearly articulated ideological positions and were the 
most coherent and disciplined part of the political spectrum. Initially, the left comprised 
the Communist, Socialist-Peasant ('Left-Centre') and Progressive Socialist factions. Most 
leftist deputies were elected on party lists and a large proportion were party members.5  
Ideologically, the Communists represented the unreformed left, favouring the 
restoration of the Soviet system of power and strongly orientated towards Russia. They 
vocally opposed President Kuchma and the current regime, but in practice their 
opposition was compromised by relations with the Presidential Administration. The 
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Socialists maintained a more moderate leftist position and the faction was parliament's 
most vociferous critic of the current regime. Although the Peasants were elected on a 
joint programme with the Socialists, the Peasants remained distinct in their 
accommodation of market reforms (except for agriculture) and their willingness to co-
operate with the existing regime. In contrast, the Progressive Socialists were the most 
radical: staunchly anti-Western and reactionary populists, they generally avoided 
alliances with the other left factions, a factor that seemed to substantiate the persistent 
rumours about their covert support by the Presidential Administration.  
 
The Centre 
The centre was the most fluid and fragmented area of the political spectrum. It was 
distinguished by the lack of a clear ideological basis and the predominance of business 
interests. Most centrist factions were built as a parliamentary power base of one or 
several 'oligarchs' and were closely linked to the Presidential Administration.6 Several of 
these factions formed political parties with the same name during the convocation on the 
basis of the faction.7 Like the majority of parties in Ukraine, these were largely based on 
the respective leader's personality and especially his/her resources. Increasingly, they 
were referred to as 'oligarch parties.'  
After 1998, there was increasingly widespread use of the term 'oligarch' in 
political commentary, following the trend in Russia.8 The slack, catchall expression was 
used to connote a small group of extremely wealthy entrepreneurs (predominantly 
connected to the energy, media and banking sectors and often combining interests in all 
three) in close proximity to the president. In exchange for policy influence, they were 
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able to offer the president media and financial support, especially during the 1999 
presidential election campaign. Factions provided a vehicle for the so-called oligarchs 
that held a deputies mandate to build a parliamentary power base, as an instrument to 
influence key decisions made by parliament.  
Ideologically, the keyword for centrist factions was pragmatism and low levels of 
party identification made the factions' composition as salient as ideology or party 
membership to understanding the interests of centrist factions.9 There was often a sharp 
divergence between their official programme and the goals pursued in parliament. For 
instance, the SDPU(o) and Trudova Ukraina ('Labouring Ukraine') espoused left-centre 
rhetoric, but were right-centre due to the sectional business concerns of their members. In 
general, centrist factions were strongly loyal to President Kuchma. However, Fatherland, 




The key features of the right factions were their party basis and ideological nature. 
However, compared to the left, right factions were more prone to fragmentation and more 
vulnerable to presidential influence. At the start of the convocation, the right consisted of 
one long-established faction, Rukh,10 but by 2000, there were three. The split of Rukh as 
a faction and party in March 1999 was not primarily ideological – both Rukhs still 
prioritised the nation-building project, a pro-European orientation and liberal economic 
reforms. However, Narodniy Rukh Ukrainy (NRU, led by Hennady Udovenko) stressed 
the 'national' aspect and was closer to the president. Ukrainskiy Narodniy Rukh (UNR, led 
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by Yury Kostenko) emphasised its liberalism and 'constructive opposition' to Kuchma. 
Reforms-Congress was the faction of the liberal Reforms and Order party. Over 50 per 
cent were former deputies and the faction attracted part of the liberal wing of the People's 
Democratic Party.  
 
In sum, the left and right were the most party-based, in terms of membership and election 
by party list, while centrist factions tended to be more heterogeneous and non-partisan. 
These patterns show continuity with the previous convocation.  
 
Factions in Context, 1998-2002  
 
The parliament elected in March 1998 had a turbulent history that can be divided into 
three periods: prior to; during; and after the parliamentary majority.  
 
Before the Majority 
In 1998, the Verkhovna Rada was elected on the basis of a new mixed electoral law. Half 
of deputies (225) were elected by proportional representation via party lists and half 
(225) by a majoritarian ('first-past-the-post') system. The four per cent threshold was 
surmounted by eight parties, while a further 23 parties gained representation via the 
single mandate constituencies. The electoral law ensured that half of the deputies owed 
their mandate directly to a political party, even if they were not all members of a party.11 
This created opportunities for a greater structuring of factions in parliament by opening 
space for the internal rules to shape incentives for party consolidation within parliament.  
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 Therefore, the Reglament (parliamentary standing orders) were amended by the 
new Rada to permit the registration of factions by only those parties that passed the four 
per cent threshold, with a minimum of 14 deputies.12 This meant that non-party factions 
ceased to be permitted registration. The change generated a clearly structured parliament, 
with the registration of eight factions. The composition of the Rada is shown in table 2 
below.  
 
Table 2: Composition of Verkhovna Rada after the March 1998 elections 
Faction No. of deputies % seats 
Communist Party (CPU) 123 27.4 
'Left-Centre' (Socialist/Peasant bloc)(SPU-SelPU) 35 7.8 
Progressive Socialists (PSPU) 17 3.8 
Total 'Leftists' 175 39.0 
   
People's Democratic Party (NDP) 89 19.8 
Green Party (PZU) 24 5.3 
Social Democratic Party (United) (SDPU(o)) 25 5.6 
Total 'Centrists' 138 30.7 
   
Rukh (NRU) 47 10.4 
Total 'Rightists' 47 10.4 
   
Hromada (non aligned oppositionist) 39 8.7 
Non-affiliated deputies 49 10.9 
Source: Registration of first factions by the secretariat of Verkhovna Rada, 14 May 1998, provided by 
Laboratory F4. 
 
However, clarity of structure did not translate into a parliamentary majority. The 
parliament was polarised between 175 left and 185 centre and right deputies who were 
more or less loyal to the president. Neither group had a majority necessary to take 
decisions (226 deputies).13 Thus, the Rada had a high propensity to deadlock and 
relations with the president were often confrontational. Usually the left were able to 
prevail due to the amorphousness and pragmatism of centrists.    
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 However, the party-only organisation of parliament was short-lived. In December 
1998, the Constitutional Court decided that the party-only factions rule was 
unconstitutional, thus clearing the way for the formation of factions by parties that had 
not surmounted the 4 per cent barrier or on a non-party basis.14 This dealt a significant 
blow to the established party factions, leading to their reduced size and influence in the 
Verkhovna Rada's organisation. However, the court upheld the Rada's amendment 
reducing the minimum size of factions to 14 deputies. The ruling prompted a large 




Chart 3: Comparison of the composition of factions in the Verkhovna Rada, May 1998 




























Source: List from the Verkhovna Rada secretariat compiled by the system 'Rada', provided by Laboratory 
F4. 
 
The forthcoming October 1999 presidential election contributed to these faction splits. At 
the same time, significantly increased inter-branch tension, particularly as the presence of 
 12
12 presidential aspirants in parliament gave the president additional incentives to try to 
discredit parliament.15 In the aftermath of the election, President Leonid Kuchma's 
victory gave him the opportunity to claim a renewed mandate to press parliament into a 
more compliant shape. 
   
The 'Artificial'  Majority 
 In January 2000, Ukraine's first parliamentary majority was formed as a consequence of 
external stimuli from the president. By threatening a referendum to reduce the 
constitutional powers of parliament if they did not form a pro-presidential majority, 
Kuchma orchestrated the formation of a centre-right majority by 11 heterogeneous 
factions. He also proposed Victor Yushchenko as the candidate for Prime Minister, a 
move calculated to appease both Western financial institutions over Ukraine's lending16 
and anchor the right wing factions into the majority.  
 Amid severe confrontation, the majority was able to install a new speaker (Ivan 
Pliushch), remove the leftist heads of committees and amend the parliamentary 
Reglament to institute majority control of the agenda and expedite the legislative process. 
Aggressive recruiting of disillusioned leftist and non-aligned deputies by the 'oligarch' 
factions meant that the majority grew from 237 to around 270 by summer 2000 (of 450 in 
total). However, the majority continued to be riddled by serious tensions. One of the most 
significant divides was between pro-presidential and pro-governmental factions. The core 
of oligarch factions strongly supported President Kuchma, but they continued to demand 
revisions of the government's composition.17 The right factions and Fatherland were 
firmly pro-Yushchenko's government and the integrity of its composition.   
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Moreover, the constitutional framework did not support the existence of a 
majority, making its functioning surreal and dependent upon the whim of the president. 
The 1996 Constitution created a president-parliamentary system where the powers of 
parliament and president overlapped in terms of oversight and dismissal of the 
government, the organisation of other executive bodies and law-making. Even so, in 
many ways the president had precedence over parliament regarding the formation, control 
and dismissal of the government. There were no provisions for the Verkhovna Rada to 
play a role in appointing the government or in taking responsibility for its actions. 
Parliament was simply required to confirm the president's nomination for Prime Minister 
(art.85.12) and the government's annual programme (art.85.6). This formally implied that 
there was no role in the current constitution for a parliamentary majority and thus, no 
incentives for factions to form and maintain a coalition that would enact the government 
programme and take responsibility for its actions. 
However, throughout the year, the president required a majority to augment his 
powers by altering the constitution in line with the overwhelming (but legally dubious) 
results of the 16 April 2000 referendum,18 which had been orchestrated with the support 
of oligarch factions. The Presidential Administration maintained pressure on the Rada to 
amend the constitution, entailing the removal of deputies' immunity from prosecution, the 
reduction of the number of deputies from 450 to 300 and granting the president the right 
to dissolve parliament if it failed to form a majority or pass the budget.19 The bill was 
passed in first reading (by 251 votes) in July 2000, but required 300 votes in the autumn 
session in order to become law. As the autumn session progressed, it became evident that 
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this would be almost impossible to find and the majority began to lose its voting integrity 
on other issues.20 
 
The 'Phoney' Majority 
The Gongadze scandal was the 'final straw' for the majority. The scandal erupted 
spectacularly in November 2000 when Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz played 
cassettes of conversations allegedly between the president, the Interior Minister and the 
head of the security service discussing 'getting rid' of journalist Georgy Gongadze, who 
had disappeared in September. The president was temporarily unable to manipulate 
parliament, the oligarch factions also lowered their profile, while the right allied with 
most of the left to call for Kuchma to resign. In the aftermath, the integrity of the 
majority was lost, but the result was a phoney majority – that voted together more or less 
as before on social policy, culture, labour and most economic questions, but were 
pragmatic on 'political' issues. For a while, the majority still functioned formally, but it 
was regularly incapable of reaching agreement. As a consequence, the influence of the 
left was again more tangible – especially as the Communists proved willing to facilitate 
the right or the centre passing some key decisions, including the dismissal of Prime 
Minister Yushchenko in April 2001. This situation lasted until the March 2002 elections.  
 
An overview of factions in context has facilitated the identification of important 
characteristics of factions and parliament and the key trends in factions' development. 
Although the new electoral law increased the role of parties in parliament, it produced a 
polarised composition that made the body prone to deadlock. In turn, this created 
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opportunities for the president to direct parliament by manipulating its constituent 
factions. The resultant majority was essentially artificial, produced and maintained by 
presidential stimuli and co-ordinated by the pro-presidential forces, organisationally 
based on factions inside the parliament. Tensions apparent at the outset did not diminish, 
because the constitutional structure and parliamentary organisation did not produce 
incentives to override or channel the majority's divergent interests. Thus, the majority 
could only be a short-lived, pragmatic phenomenon reliant on external pressure for 
cohesion. Ultimately, the temporary weakening of the president's position during the 
Gongadze scandal removed this pressure and factions reverted to type: to forming 
situational, tactical majorities depending on the issue under consideration, not dissimilar 
to the previous convocation.   
 Nevertheless, as we shall see, internal rule changes during the convocation helped 
to promote greater structuring and organisation of factions as sub-institutions of 
parliament. The extent of faction institutionalisation and factors shaping it will be 
assessed in the next section. 
 
Factions as Parliamentary Sub-institutions 
 
By considering factions' coherence and organisational complexity, it will be 
demonstrated that factions became more organisationally sophisticated, but that their 
growing coherence in voting was superficial and significantly undermined by 




 Huntington emphasises the importance of coherence and discipline to an organisation: 
'The greater the disunity…the less it is institutionalised'.21 This is logical because any 
group seeking to achieve specific aims (for instance, gaining political influence and 
shaping policy, legislation) needs a regular team of engaged players that work together 
for the group's goals.22 Therefore, the high instability of faction membership identified in 
the Verkhovna Rada and other post-Soviet parliaments can be seen as problematic for 
parliamentary development.23 A recent study by Herron demonstrated statistically that 
electoral, policy and partisan factors influenced deputy's decisions about switching 
faction, but concluded that other factors may influence legislators, namely internal 
parliamentary rules and exogenous events.24 This article explores the importance of these 
'other factors', focusing on identifying the relational and process aspects of the various 
factors, rather than seeking to quantify them. First of all, it is necessary to identify the 
patterns of faction membership fluidity, before assessing the causes. Table 4 below 
provides a broad indicator of the extent of fluctuations of faction membership, by giving 
faction sizes at six monthly intervals throughout the convocation. Although the table does 
not fully demonstrate the degree of deputy movement between factions, it illustrates the 
main patterns of faction growth and diminution.  
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Communists L 119 122 122 115 116 114 111 113 113 113 
Left-Centre L 35 24 24 22 19 17 16 17 18 17 
Peasants L - 14 15 15 - - - - - - 
Progressive 
Socialists L 
17 14 14 11 - - - - - - 
Hromada 39 45 17 14 - - - - - - 
Solidarity C - - - - 16 28 23 21 21 20 
Trudova 
Ukraina C 
- - 17 23 31 44 48 46 38 38 
SDPU(o) C 25 23 25 34 33 33 33 36 32 32 
Greens C 24 26 23 18 16 17 17 17 15 16 
Revival of the 
Regions* C 
- - 28 36 36 36 35 26 15 15 
Regions of 
Ukraine C 
- - - - - - - 22 23 23 




89 76 31 27 25 23 20 16 14 14 
Independents C - 25 20 14 - - - - - - 
Unity C - - - - - - - - 18 21 
Fatherland C - - 26 35 34 34 32 24 24 24 
Reforms-
Congress R 
- - 24 13 14 15 15 15 14 15 
Rukh 
(Kostenko) R 
- - 30 26 21 21 23 22 22 23 
Rukh 
(Udovenko) R 
47 48 15 17 18 19 17 14 14 14 
Non-affiliated 36 32 16 25 50 49 45 44 48 46 
* Changed name to Democratic Union, 6.4.2001. 
L, C and R after each faction name connotes their broad political orientation as left, right and center 
respectively.  
Source: 21 January 2000 and 29 February 2000 figures taken from Olexiy Haran, and Oleksandr 
Maiboroda, (eds.), Ukrains'ki Livi: mizh Leninismom i Sotsial-demokratieiu (Kyiv: KM Akademiia, 2000) 
p.222. Others from the Verkhovna Rada secretariat, provided by Laboratory F4. 
 
The table indicates that all factions experienced membership instability to some extent, 
although this was very minor for the Communists. During 1998 faction membership was 
relatively stable, the only sizable upheavals being the uncoupling of the Socialist and 
Peasant alliance and the formation of Independents by a group of single mandate deputies 
who wanted to gain the selective benefits (office space, staff etc.) of faction status.25 
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From 1999, faction membership fluidity increased dramatically, with the splits of Rukh, 
NDP, Hromada and SDPU(o) forming the basis of new factions and a large volume of 
faction switching by individual deputies. Table four also suggests that some centrist 
factions (Trudova Ukraina, SDPU(o), Revival of the Regions, Fatherland) were 
successful at recruiting significant numbers of new members, although this varied over 
time. These trends can be explained by exploring the incentives produced by changes in 
the Reglament (standing orders) and the strategic behaviour of executive bodies and 
different groups of deputies. 
 The effect of the electoral law was not so considerable. A trend is tangible, but 
other factors took primacy in determining deputies' 'political tourism'.26 Deputies elected 
in single mandate constituencies were more likely to switch faction, because they did not 
owe their seat to a party and over 50 per cent did not belong to any party. However, party 
list deputies also moved often – particularly if they were elected on the lists of centrist 
parties SDPU(o) and NDP. Deputies from the Rukh, Green and Socialist-Peasant party 
lists moved slightly less frequently. Communists rarely left their faction, regardless of 
mandate type.  
 Internal rule changes had a much more significant impact on behaviour. The 
relative faction stability during 1998 can be attributed to the amendment to the Reglament 
granting parties that passed the four per cent barrier the exclusive right to unite in 
factions. This removed the possibility of new faction formation and acted to constrain 
deputies' 'political tourism'. Therefore, the Constitutional Court ruling had a significant 
impact on the internal dynamics of factions. While ruling this amendment 
unconstitutional, the court upheld the amendment to reduce the minimum size of factions 
 19
to 14.27 This latter amendment had in effect been dormant due to the countervailing effect 
of the party-only factions rule, but now it started to structure factions' incentives and 
opportunities. It allowed larger factions to split without incurring costs that the loss of 
faction status brought (e.g. loss of office space) and the formation of new factions and 
deputy groups with minimal start-up costs.  
This rule facilitated wider fragmentation than seen in the previous convocation, as 
then 25 deputies were required for faction status. It permitted the split and survival of the 
Rukh and Hromada factions, but these splits were encouraged by the interference of the 
president, who sought to weaken his opponents. For instance, Hromada was perceived as 
particularly troublesome and was subject to intense pressure from the executive. When 
criminal proceedings for corruption were instigated against its leader, Lazarenko, he fled 
abroad, later being apprehended in Switzerland. Lazarenko's close counterpart in the 
faction (and previously in business), Yulia Tymoshenko was a vociferous critic of 
Kuchma, but she was regularly seen meeting with the president in late 1998 and by 
March 1999 she split the faction to create her own, Fatherland. One analyst summarised 
this practice: 'some people are brought close [to the president] and others are distanced. 
This is an ongoing, deliberate process, but was particularly obvious before the 
presidential elections.'28 By a strategy of 'divide and rule', exploiting the differences 
within and between factions, Kuchma's administration was able to shape the patterns of 
influence inside the Verkhovna Rada by manipulating the size of factions. 
The court ruling also removed constraints on deputy movement, permitting 
powerful individuals to form centrist factions. The so-called oligarchs had vast resources 
– financial, media and proximity to the president – and were capable of organising their 
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own faction and attracting other deputies by their influence and, in some cases, with 
financial incentives. Such factions were likely to be attractive to entrepreneur-deputies 
and there were at least 100 deputies with commercial interests and without strong 
ideological convictions, who switch faction on the basis of personal connections. 
Furthermore, these resource-rich factions (e.g. Revival of the Regions, Trudova Ukraina, 
SDPU(o)) were able to aggressively recruit deputies. This tendency became particularly 
marked after the presidential election, as factions sought to maximise their size at the 
expense of their competitors in order to strengthen their bargaining position over, firstly, 
government formation and then in the new majority, as larger factions would be entitled 
to more leadership positions in strategic committees. 
The referendum threat and majority formation prompted faction switching on an 
extraordinary scale. During interviews with the author in 2000, representatives from five 
factions (majority factions Rukh-Kostenko, Reforms-Congress, Greens, plus the 
Socialists and Communists) reported pressure on their faction and attempts to dissolve 
them. Such reports were widespread, but the mechanisms by which this was pursued 
were more obscure.29 'Pressure' was described by parliamentary staff and deputies as 
having two forms: pressure on a deputy's business (i.e. blackmail) and financial 
enticement of deputies (i.e. bribery). One source (from a majority faction) stated: 
Because we are in opposition to Kuchma, there were attempts to dissolve our 
faction. Some entrepreneurs were forced to leave due to pressure [on their 
businesses]. Others were simply bought. It's no secret that they were paid $30-
50,000 to leave. So some of them left. 
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 Clearly, only agencies of the executive have the apparatus to apply pressure to a business 
(in the form of various 'inspections'), but this aspect of pressure remains opaque and open 
to speculation about its extent.30 Bribery was more openly discussed as a tactic of the so-
called oligarchic factions, most blatantly by SDPU(o) member and ex-president, Leonid 
Kravchuk: 'I can say nothing bad about oligarchs – if someone is for sale, they will buy 
him. Here everything occurs in this manner – voting and [faction] transfers.'31 During the 
second half of 2000, such trends were influenced by the need to increase the majority to 
300 deputies to facilitate the passage of the president's amendments to the constitution. 
 In sum, faction coherence was extremely weak, although the Communists 
remained remarkably intact. However, the Reglament amendment temporarily reduced 
faction fluidity, demonstrating the potential role of internal rules in structuring deputies' 
behaviour. Once overruled,  'political tourism' and 'political prostitution' exploded on an 
unprecedented scale. In the absence of constraining rules, the deliberate tactics of the 
president and deputy-'oligarchs' close to him exploited and contributed to the weakness of 
factions. Therefore, on the whole, factions exhibited lower institutional coherence than in 
the previous convocation, making it possible to talk of de-institutionalisation. Such a 
process severely limits factions' capacity to develop as strategic actors within parliament, 
posing the gravest threat to the development of a parliamentary party system and making 
the legislature itself extremely vulnerable to outside manipulation.   
 It is against this backdrop that any consideration of voting discipline must take 
place, as it is impossible to draw meaningful conclusions about institutionalisation from 
voting coherence alone. The longitudinal statistical analysis of all roll-call votes 
undertaken by Laboratory F4 has been used to identify the general patterns of faction 
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discipline during the convocation. These will be explained in terms of faction 
composition, internal parliamentary rules and the political context. During the pre-
majority period (March 1998 – February 2000), continuity with the previous convocation 
in patterns of voting was evident. Factions at the extremes of the political spectrum were 
consistently more disciplined than the centre, where comparatively poor attendance 
augmented voting coherence problems.32 Thus, the Communists, Left-Centre and Rukh 
were most disciplined, while Fatherland, SDPU(o), Revival of the Regions and Reforms-
Congress were least coherent,33 and the party-only faction rule amendment did not 
significantly affect voting discipline. Furthermore, the secret voting procedures did not 
assist faction discipline.   
The formation of the majority intentionally brought key changes in faction 
discipline – one of the first decisions taken was to amend the Reglament to ensure all 
voting took place on an open, roll-call basis.34 This gave faction leaders hitherto 
unavailable information about how faction members were voting, enabling them to 
monitor the results of strict voting decisions and apply informal sanctions where 
appropriate. As well as empowering faction leaders to increase discipline, the amendment 
also tackled the perennial problem of poor attendance by stipulating that all voting takes 
place on Thursdays. This made it easier for deputies with businesses to vote.  
The impact on voting discipline for the centre factions was dramatic. During the 
5th session (February-July 2000), these new rules combined with the psychological effect 
of a majority (particularly under pressure from issues attendant to the referendum) and 
produced unprecedented discipline in factions SDPU(o), NDP and Revival of the 
Regions, which together with the relatively well-disciplined Greens and Rukhs created a 
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critical mass to get decisions passed. Although they were supported in voting decisions 
by Trudova Ukraina and Fatherland, these factions continued to have problems with 
discipline.35 By the 6th session (September 2000-January 2001), there had been a marked 
improvement in the internal cohesion of Trudova Ukraina and Solidarity, while 
Fatherland and new non-majority faction Yabluko were least disciplined.36 The patterns 
of faction discipline did not change substantially after the Gongadze scandal in the period 
termed the 'phoney majority' (January 2001-March 2002). By this time, high levels of 
voting coherence were attainable by all factions.37 
 In sum, although the Communists and Socialists had maintained strong voting 
coherence since the previous convocation, the rule change enacted by the majority to roll-
call voting led to increased discipline in all factions due to increased transparency and 
this effect was augmented by the very existence of a majority. The creation of an 
institutional mechanism to facilitate faction leaders' greater control over their members 
and increase faction cohesion and identity was a positive step towards factions' 
institutionalisation in the Verkhovna Rada. However, the marked increase in faction 
membership fluidity during and after the formation of the majority substantially undercut 
the significance of greater discipline and there were two countervailing trends along the 
dimensions identified for assessing factions' coherence. 
 
Organisational Complexity  
On the whole, factions' internal organisations became more structured and developed in 
comparison to the previous convocation.38 The increased status of factions was indicated 
at the start of the convocation with the provision of a secretariat to each faction. In 
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comparison to the one consultant allocated in the last convocation, now the minimum was 
three staff – one head, one consultant and one specialist. The size of secretariats paid for 
from the Rada budget ranged from three to twelve, but the factions or the party paid for 
additional consultants and made use of deputies’ assistants, so that on average, factions 
were operating with staffs of around 15. In general, the secretariats provided 
administrative support and expertise on legislative matters. However, given the 
aforementioned wealth and resources of the so-called 'oligarchic factions', inevitably 
there was a visible disparity in the resources that factions were able to draw upon. 
Although the provisions of the parliamentary budget were quite meagre, centrist factions 
such as Revival of the Regions and Trudova Ukraina were able to utilise much wider 
sources of expertise.  
In general, factions met more regularly than in the previous convocation.39 
Usually, they met once or twice per plenary week. Faction meetings were used primarily 
to discuss voting decisions (which were usually strict – free votes were rare), for faction 
leaders to report back on meetings with the president and sometimes government 
ministers attended to lobby forthcoming bills.40 
 As well as gaining their own secretariat support and meeting more regularly than 
the previous convocation, approximately half of the factions took steps to increase the 
formal structure and division of labour within their internal organisation. Some factions 
adopted internal rules that set out procedures for meetings, the responsibilities of deputies 
and the leadership.41 Other secretariat staff explained that the (vague) guidelines provided 
by the Rada's Reglament were currently adequate and stressed the crucial role of 
interpersonal relations and the leader's influence in intra-faction co-ordination. Thus, 
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these factions exhibited a preference for flexibility and were unwilling to set down rules 
or a formal structure that could potentially foreclose options in the future, reflecting the 
wider parliamentary rules culture. Furthermore, these factions were those with the least 
stable membership and minimal party basis, so that they were less a parliamentary party 
caucus and more a vehicle for lobbying sectional interests in the Rada.  
In a minority of factions, a division of labour between deputies and consultants 
was laid down. The Socialists, both Rukhs and the People's Democratic Party organised 
the faction into three or four ‘internal committees’ broadly along the divisions of legal, 
economic and social/humanitarian policy areas. In these internal committees, deputies 
from the relevant profile committees and consultants could discuss their committee work, 
impending legislative bills and other related issues. In practice, the level of activity of 
these 'internal committees' was difficult to discern as interviews produced countervailing 
evidence to the formal rule documents. For instance, staff of Rukh-Udovenko secretariat 
said there was no formal procedure for co-ordinating committee work and a Socialist 
deputy showed no awareness of his faction's internal committees.42 This sub-institution 
level evidence suggests a thoroughgoing congruence with the parliament as a whole, 
where formal rules lacked authority and had a 'decorative' purpose (rather like Soviet era 
constitutions) that masked actual behaviour and organisational power. This was not 
necessarily deliberate as factions' good intentions to better structure deputies' legislative 
work probably dissipated as the day-to-day realities of work in the Verkhovna Rada 
unfolded.   
The increased institutional support provided to factions in the form of a 
secretariat, office space and equipment raised the possibilities for factions to develop a 
 26
greater organisational capacity. However, the result was patchy, as factions on the left 
and right tended to take the initiative to develop a party caucus organisational base. Not 
accidentally, these factions – Socialists, Communists, both Rukhs, Reforms-Congress – 
existed in the previous convocation and had organisational experience and traditions to 
build upon. To some extent, centrist factions could bypass the need for this kind of 
structure by buying expertise from external bodies and relying on personal connections 
and good access to the president. This pattern was not significantly affected by the 
formation and collapse of the majority. Yet on the whole, all factions did become more 
structured and organisationally complex and thus more capable of supporting deputies in 
their legislative work and of ensuring they were better informed. It laid the groundwork 
for greater faction participation in the legislative process and parliamentary leadership, 
more disciplined factions and the creation of a stronger sense of faction belonging and 
identity, but these potential developments were substantially inhibited by faction 
membership instability.  
 
Factions' Activity and Influence   
  
What kind of impact did better structured and disciplined factions have on parliament? 
Two key sites of faction activity – leadership bodies and the legislative process – are 
examined because they are both fundamental to a parliament's functioning and they can 
usefully illustrate the changing role of factions during the convocation. 
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'Factions in First Place': Leadership organs 
The role of faction leaders in organising parliament remained vaguely defined before 
majority formation. The Reglament briefly described the Conciliation Council of 
Factions, envisaging ad hoc meetings of faction leaders to settle inter-faction disputes, 
particularly during plenary sessions.43 However, following the tradition established by 
speaker Moroz in the previous convocation, the body was used by speaker (and Peasant 
Party entrepreneur) Tkachenko to meet faction leaders and committee heads to discuss 
his draft agenda. Although the Conciliation Council of Factions played a substantial role 
in the initial allocation of leadership posts, the role of the body was not formalised and de 
facto, speaker Tkachenko was able to exercise strict personal control over the agenda.44 
Although the Conciliation Council was the key formal site for faction heads to influence 
the Rada's organisation, it was widely seen as a talking shop loyal to Tkachenko and 
relatively unimportant once the allocation of committees and resources had taken place.45  
Crucial decisions were made elsewhere: either in the speaker's (by now, rather extensive) 
apparat; in the regular meetings between faction leaders and the Presidential 
Administration; or in the corridors of parliament.  
 The formation of the majority in January 2000 fundamentally altered the 
leadership and organisational role of factions. By a combination of endogenous 
institutional engineering and more informal means, the majority augmented the position 
of factions in parliamentary decision-making to ensure their control over all aspects of 
the Verkhovna Rada's activity.  The role of the Conciliation Council of Factions was 
codified by an amendment to the Reglament, so that it officially comprised the speaker 
and faction heads as voting members and committee heads and the deputy speakers in an 
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advisory role. It was stipulated that the Council must set the weekly draft agenda (that 
would be confirmed by a plenary vote) and decide bill prioritisation.46 Thus, formally, the 
Conciliation Council of Factions was designated as the Rada's leadership organ and the 
role of factions via their leaders was decisive. 
 Yet in reality, it was the Co-ordination Council of the Majority (Ko-ordinatsyina 
Rada Bil'shosty or KRB) that took on the key decision-making role in parliament. The 
KRB was formed in January 2000 on the basis of the signed agreement by the then eleven 
factions comprising the majority as its leadership body. Leaders of the majority factions 
met on Mondays immediately before the Conciliation Council of Factions to decide the 
week's draft agenda. Decisions were taken in the same way as the Conciliation Council: 
faction leaders reported how their faction would vote on a bill so that 226 'votes' was 
expected to translate into a bill's passage in plenary and bills not supported by the 
majority would not be put on the agenda.47 This method of decision-making in both 
leadership organs represented an important change, as previously it took place on a one 
faction, one vote basis, which had created incentives for factions to divide. Such a 
leadership structure could help to encourage faction consolidation, if countervailing 
influences such as financial inducement could be eradicated. 
 After ascertaining which bills they could pass, the KRB formulated a draft agenda 
to pass to the Conciliation Council for technical corrections. By making all committee 
heads representatives of the majority, the pre-eminence of majority interests in the 
Conciliation Council was assured. The KRB worked closely with the Presidential 
Administration and became very influential in factions' voting decisions, which reduced 
majority factions' autonomy in deciding how to vote on a particular bill. Yet at the same 
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time, these factions had a greater opportunity to influence a bill's passage. Concomitant to 
this, the 'minority' factions were left outside this framework and the Communist and 
Socialist leaders were rarely invited to meet the president after 1999, so that their ability 
to influence legislation was largely restricted to committee work.     
 Correspondingly, the role of the speaker and committee heads diminished vis-à-
vis factions. Factions allocated the committee leaderships between them, and committee 
heads came to play a primarily consultative role in the leadership. Furthermore, the new 
speaker, Pliushch, was elected by the majority after a deal struck in the KRB. Therefore, 
he was obliged to take decisions together with the KRB and was more circumscribed in 
his actions than his predecessors. In this respect, the Verkhovna Rada's speaker began to 
resemble a Western parliamentary speaker. As the majority drifted into a 'phoney 
majority' towards the end of 2000, these structures and procedures did not alter 
significantly – only the majority was less capable of guaranteeing a bill's passage and, 
consequently, the position of the left factions was given greater consideration.     
 
Legislative Activity 
The most discernable impact of the formation of the majority was increased legislative 
output. In the 4th session (September 1999-February 2000), 134 laws were passed, 
compared to 209 in the following session (February-July 2000).48 Official sources claim 
this was a direct result of the majority formation and proof of its effectiveness due to 
improved relations with the executive.49 However, figures tell but part of the story and 
during the convocation, the shifts in faction behaviour towards the legislative process 
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were subtle and contained strong elements of continuity not only between the earlier 
identified stages of faction development, but also with the previous convocation.  
 The dramatic change in the number of bills passed can largely be explained by the 
altered contexts in which the two sessions took place, although internal rule changes also 
had an impact. The 4th session and the three preceding it were subject to the overbearing 
influence of the impending presidential elections upon factions' behaviour. Thus, with the 
presence of twelve presidential candidates in parliament, considerable plenary time was 
taken up with campaigning via the legislative process. Such measures included 
introducing populist issues that stood little chance of enactment.50 Therefore, the 
forthcoming election raised tensions within parliament and with the executive (see 
below). The existence of the majority led to increased law-making for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the majority created mechanisms to expedite the passage of bills through plenary 
by making Thursday the only voting day, by reducing the allocated time for reports and 
debates on bills,51 and by often sidestepping the procedure for full article-by-article 
second reading.52 Furthermore, the majority and the KRB provided a forum for horse-
trading between factions, so they could strike deals to mutually support each other's bills. 
For instance, in June 2000 Fatherland agreed to vote for the privatisation of Ukrtelecom 
in return for SDPU(o)'s support of their leader and deputy Prime Minister's amendments 
to the law 'On electro-energy'.53 It is instructive to note that in this case the deal failed to 
hold, with Fatherland splitting on the Ukrtelecom bill, and SDPU(o) reneging completely. 
The majority was always 'amorphous like kholodets [aspic]'.54 Thus, a second factor is 
required to fully explain the increased legislative activity: the president's influence. As 
argued above, the main cohesive agent for the majority was presidential pressure, which 
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encouraged compromises between its constituent factions. However, the president 
himself remained ambiguous in his attitude to Yushchenko's government, so that the 
president-government-parliament triangle was riddled with tensions and even with the 
majority, the passage of government bills was far from guaranteed.55  
 Prior to majority formation, conflictual legislative-executive relations were in part 
played out via the legislative process, as occurred in the previous convocation. At the 
institutional level, relations between the president and parliament were hostile, but at the 
same time the president and factions interacted on a bilateral basis to lobby bills. The 
legislative process was marked by regular impasse: the president vetoed 1 in 3 laws 
passed and the Rada, rarely able to find the 300 votes necessary to override a veto, passed 
'new versions' of these laws by making small adjustments and adopting them again. 
Unsurprisingly, such bills were often vetoed a second (or third) time. Even where a veto 
was overridden by the Rada, Kuchma sometimes refused to sign them. Such shenanigans 
were especially common over any legislation concerning inter-branch relations.56 Even 
after the majority's formation, deadlock over all bills in the sphere of executive-
legislative and local government relations persisted.57 Compromise between the branches 
over the division of powers proved elusive as both parliament and president sought to 
maximise their influence within the constitutional framework, and the majority had no 
clear position on these issues. The pro-government factions more or less sought to protect 
the parliament's prerogatives and believed that the government should be formed by a 
parliamentary majority. The 'oligarch' factions had no united position, even within 
individual factions, as prominent pro-presidential parliamentarians such as deputy 
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speaker and SDPU(o) leader Viktor Medvedchuk were torn between greater power for 
their party in parliament and their presidential ambitions.    
However, in other spheres (e.g. the economy) the existence of the majority did 
lead to improved relations with the president. While the Presidential Administration 
began to routinely survey all bills going through parliament, the president regularly met 
with majority faction heads, so each could ascertain the other's attitude to a bill and make 
the corresponding changes to get it through parliament and obtain the president's 
signature. The majority took measures to better implement the president's constitutional 
right to priority examination of his bills.58 In this respect, relations with the Presidential 
Administration became more constructive, based on trading and compromises, making 
the legislative process more predictable. As a result, the proportion of bills vetoed fell 
from 1 in 3 to less than 1 in 5.59 However, while this trading took place at the level of 
factions, it also transcended them (although the precise extent is difficult to determine). 
While the faction leaders met with the president, and made deals between themselves, it 
is evident that support for bills was also gathered by more unorthodox means similar to 
those used to stimulate faction membership fluidity. The president and so-called deputy-
oligarchs close to him could engineer the requisite number of votes for a bill by payment 
to deputies and by applying pressure to their businesses.60 The presence of such 
influences on deputies' voting decisions indicates the power of so-called oligarchic 
groupings (or 'clans') within and beyond inter-faction relations, which served to 
undermine the role of factions per se in legislative decisions. 
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On one hand, factions' activity during the convocation was characterised by continuity 
with the previous convocation: perpetual president-parliament conflict over all legislation 
that would regulate their relations that in turn prompted inter- and intra-faction discord 
over this pivotal issue; and the pervading influence of the president's attitude to a bill on 
factions' voting decisions. On the other hand, the mid-term formation of the majority did 
produce important changes, achieved largely through internal rule amendments. Outside 
the sphere of legislative-executive relations, the legislative process became more 
consensual, productive and predictable. Factions assumed the dominant role in the 
leadership and organisation of parliamentary organs, activity and the legislative process. 
Yet at the same time, the majority factions' close collusion with the Presidential 
Administration and manipulation by deputy-oligarchs associated with the president 
undermined the decisiveness of factions' role in the Verkhovna Rada. 
 
Prospects: Early Indications after the 2002 Elections 
 
The new convocation of the Verkhovna Rada was elected in March 2002. Despite some 
differences in composition, the first months of its operation suggest there will be strong 
elements of continuity with the 1998-2002 Rada in the patterns of faction and wider 
parliamentary development. The elections did produce some notable changes that will 
undoubtedly impact upon the internal dynamics of parliament. Only six parties/blocs 
surmounted the four per cent barrier for list seats, pointing to trends of (at least 
temporary) party consolidation. The fissiparous tendencies of the right were seemingly 
overcome as they coalesced into a single bloc Our Ukraine around the presidential 
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aspirant, Viktor Yushchenko. Our Ukraine gained 23.4 per cent of the list vote (first 
place) and 119 seats in total. Henceforth, the Communists (with 20 per cent and 64 seats) 
were no longer the largest faction. After aggressive recruiting, with widespread reports of 
pressure on deputies' businesses, the pro-presidential centrist bloc United Ukraine briefly 
assumed this mantle.61 Despite winning only 12 per cent of the list vote and 119 seats in 
total, the bloc was able to entice a further 60 or so single mandate entrepreneurs to join 
the faction. After securing the election of bloc leader Volodmyr Lytvyn as Rada speaker, 
United Ukraine immediately split into 9 factions. Therefore, the broad parliamentary 
cleavages differed significantly from the previous convocation, with a stronger right and 
weaker left. Nevertheless, as before, the fragmented centre factions were the linchpin in 
decision making, cobbling together a pro-presidential majority during autumn 2002.  
 Other continuities remain pronounced. A fragmented composition and absence of 
a 'natural' majority are long-standing features of the Verkhovna Rada. Moreover, patterns 
of faction fragmentation and membership fluidity continue, confirming the growing 
weight of business and money in parliament's operations, which will continue to 
circumscribe opportunities for faction institutionalisation. Entrepreneurs remain  
vulnerable to pressure on their businesses, permitting the continuation of the president's 
'divide and rule' tactics to manipulate parliament via factions.62 Perhaps the most 
significant similarity with the previous convocation is that the first two years of its term 
will be preoccupied with a presidential election. However, 2004 is particularly crucial as 
President Kuchma will have served his constitutionally-limited two terms and the 
question of successor remains open. This will place enormous strain on all factions and 
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means that faction and parliamentary institutionalisation is likely to proceed in the 




During 1998-2002, factions took on a greater role in parliament's legislative work and 
leadership. To a large extent, these changes were achieved by endogenous rule 
amendments, especially as the majority sought to consolidate its position within the Rada. 
Internal tinkering was the primary instrument of institutional engineering, which helped 
to promote the nascent institutionalisation of factions, permitting them to play a larger 
role in shaping the parliament’s capacity to exercise key functions of the state.  
 However, the role factions, and hence parliament itself, could play in Ukrainian 
politics was circumscribed by the broader institutional nexus and political context. Given 
the absence of a substantial role for parliament in government formation, incentives for 
factions' institutional consolidation and co-operation (as with political parties more 
generally) remained poor. The president consistently demonstrated his interest in feeble, 
fluid factions susceptible to his own influence or that of his allies in parliament. The 
tactics pursued by these agents to split and break factions ensured that the latter remained 
fragile and mutable institutions. Although factions assumed the prime position in 
parliament, their weakness meant that parliament itself remained open to external 
pressure and thus incapable of providing genuine 'checks and balances' to the executive, 
such as legislative scrutiny, oversight and popular accountability.  
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The Ukrainian case illustrates how faction institutionalisation is central to the 
development of structured, coherent and autonomous parliamentary activity and also the 
deleterious consequences of weakly developed party caucuses to democratic procedure 
and parliamentary capacity. Furthermore, the case demonstrates how the process of 
institutionalisation of parties in post-Soviet parliaments is mediated between ‘higher 
order’ rules such as the Constitutional framework, endogenous rules and powerful 
external actors such as the president. This implies that although specific institutional 
reforms can help to promote party consolidation and parliamentary development, the 
attitude of the president to such reforms will critically affect institutional outcomes. 
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